

Message Text

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USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9674

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: UK PAPER ON NUCLEAR QUESTION

1. TEXT OF UK PAPER QUOTE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE: RESPONSE TO
THE LIKELY ARGUMENTS OF THE EASTERN SIDE UNQUOTE FOLLOWS.
PAPER WHICH IS MUCH REDUCED VERSION OF EARLIER MORE AMBITIOUS
UNDERTAKING WAS SUBMITTED TO AHG MEETING NOVEMBER 22. DISCUSSION OF
IT WAS DEFERRED TO NEXT SESSION.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE NUCLEAR ISSUE: RESPONSE TO THE LIKELY ARGUMENTS OF THE
EASTERN SIDE

1. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN SIDE INTEND TO ARGUE
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STRONGLY FOR THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE SCOPE OF AN

MBFR AGREEMENT. PAGE 6 OF AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT ON 8 NOVEMBER SAYS THAT ARTICLE 2 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES PROVIDES FOR PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT TO REDUC "THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS". HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN PROPOSING THIS THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDED FROM THE FACT THAT "CAPABILITIES OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE DETERMINED BY THE ENTIRE COMPLEX AND THE TYPES OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS STATIONED THERE".

2. IN INFORMAL CONTACTS THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY MADE THE POINT THAT THE ALLIED STATEMENT ON DISPARITIES DID NOT REFER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE POINT. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT THEY WILL PROBABLY USE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ORIGINAL, AND PUBLICLY DECLARED, PURPOSE OF NATO FOR INTRODUCING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS TO COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF MANPOWER.

B. NATO'S ADMITTED INTENTION AT THAT TIME WAS TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF WAR, WHETHER OR NOT THE WARSAW PACT USED THEM.

C. PUBLIC OPINION WILL EXPECT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS WILL NOT LEAVE OUT PARTICULAR FORCE ELEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE ELEMENT WITH THE GREATEST CAPACITY FOR DESTRUCTION, I.E. NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

D. DESPITE THE ALLEGED CHANGE IN NATO STRATEGY IN THE 1960'S FROM MASSIVE RETALIATION TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

E. THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE CONTINUALLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT A NO-FIRST-USE AGREEMENT.

F. SIMILARLY, THEY HAVE ALSO REJECTED WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, SUCH AS THE RAPACKI PLAN.

G. THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE CONTINUED TO IMPROVE, BOTH IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY, THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPLOYED
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IN CENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES.

H. NATO ITSELF, IN ITS PUBLICATION "ALLIED DEFENCE IN THE SEVENTIES" (AD70), HAS QUOTED FIGURES FOR TACTICAL WARHEADS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE WHICH SHOW THAT NATO HAS TWICE AS MANY (7,000) AS THE WARSAW PACT (3,500).

3. IT IS CLEARLY UNDESIRABLE FOR ALLIED DELEGATES TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH EASTERN DELEGATES ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, LEST THAT IMPLY A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON NUCLEAR FORCES IN MBFR. NO DOUBT THE EASTERN DELEGATES WILL BE PERSISTENT IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DRAW WESTERN DELEGATES INTO DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEAR ISSUES. ANY DETAILED RESPONSE BY WESTERN DELEGATES OR INDICATION OF ANY WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT, HOWEVER GENERALLY, COULD IN ITSELF ENCOURAGE FURTHER PROBING BY THE EAST ON THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THE WEST IS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR ISSUES WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE AGREED ALLIED POSITION TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND WEAKEN THE POSITION WHICH THE ALLIES ARE TAKING.

LINE TO TAKE IN INFORMAL OR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

4. UNTIL THE WESTERN SIDE DEPLOYS MORE DETAILED ARGUMENTS IN PLENARY MEETINGS (SEE PARAS 5 AND 6 BELOW), WE SHOULD STICK FIRMLY TO THE LINE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BLUR THE FOCUS ON CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES IN AN AGREED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA FOR REDUCTIONS: THIS WOULD NOT BE THE WAY TO MAKE QUICK PRGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

LINE FOR USE IN ALLIED PLENARY PRESENTATIONS

5. IT WILL, HOWEVER, BE NECESSARY TO DEPLOY FURTHER ARGUMENTS IN REPLY TO THE WARSAW PACT. THESE ARGUMENTS ARE BEST PUT FORWARD AS ALLIED STATEMENTS IN PLENARY MEETINGS. THE FOLLOWING BASIC POINTS COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR USE IN FORMULATING ALLIED STATEMENTS:

A. WE SHOULD REPEAT THE LINE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO MBFR WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE AN ALREADY CONFIDENTIAL

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COMPLEX NEGOTIATION.

B. WE SHOULD STRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEREVER DEPLOYED AND WHETHER "STRATEGIC" OR "TACTICAL", ON THE ONE HAND, AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ON THE OTHER; THIS DISTINCTION HAS BEEN RECOGNISED THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 9674

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS - FROM US REP MBFR

C. IT IS THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AGGRAVATED BY THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY, WHICH ARE THE CAUSES OF PRESENT INSTABILITY, AND FROM WHICH THE RISKS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED ARISE.

D. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF A COMMON CEILING, WOULD REDUCE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MAKE IT LESS LIKELY THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD EVER FEEL THE NEED TO USE THEM.

E. THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD, THEREFORE, CONCENTRATE ON CORRECTING THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS OF DISPARITY, WHICH LIE IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

6. IN RESPONDING IN PLENARY STATEMENTS TO POSSIBLE EASTERN
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ARGUMENTS WE COULD ALSO DRAW, IF NECESSARY, ON THE FOLLOWING

POINTS:

A. QUESTION. NATO'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE SPECIFICALLY INTRODUCED TO COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF MANPOWER. OUGHT NOT NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT SECURING A COMMON CEILING FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BE ACCOMPANIED BY NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT SEEKING PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA?

ANSWER. WE BELIEVE THAT A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IS A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN SUCH MANPOWER AND NOT FOR OTHER REASONS. THIS DISPARITY AND OTHER DISPARITIES IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES ARE, WE BELIEVE, THE MOST IMPORTANT CAUSES OF POTENTIAL INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

B. QUESTION. WESTERN PUBLICATIONS GENERALLY AGREE THAT NATO ENJOYS ADVANTAGES IN NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA. SHOULD NOT THIS DISPARITY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT?

ANSWER. WE KNOW OF NO PUBLISHED FIGURES RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. ANY DISCUSSION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORCES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD EXTEND THE WHOLE NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

C. QUESTION. IF THE AIM IS TO SEEK PARITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THERE CAN SURELY BE NO FURTHER OBJECTION TO A NO-FIRST-USE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

ANSWER. THIS IS A PROPOSAL DEALING WITH INTENTIONS RATHER THAN HARD FACTS. IT LIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS CONFERENCE.

D. QUESTION. BUT SURELY NATO'S STRATEGY IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS BASED ON EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR THIS REASON THEY SHOULD BE COVERED IN ANY REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT?

ANSWER. NATO'S STRATEGY IS BASED ON FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, TOGETHER WITH FORWARD DEFENCE. THE BASIS OF DETERRENCE IS THAT MAJOR AGGRESSION SHOULD BE DETERRED BY THE THREAT OF ESCALATION. A MORE STABLE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WOULD REDUCE THE RISKS OF CONFLICT.

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E. QUESTION. WHAT ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES? SHOULD NOT THESE BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT?

ANSWER. BOTH SIDES HAVE IMPROVED OR REPLACED THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN RECENT YEARS. THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF THIS, WHICH IS PART OF THE NORMAL PROCESS BY WHICH NATIONS MAINTAIN THEIR OWN SECURITY, BEING ABANDONED EXCEPT UNDER SOME SPECIFIC AGREEMENT.

END TEXTHUMES

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